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Abstract
We deduce a simple closed formula for illiquid corporate coupon bond prices when liquid bonds
with similar characteristics (e.g. maturity) are present in the market for the same issuer. The
key model parameter is the time-to-liquidate a position, i.e. the time that an experienced bond
trader takes to liquidate a given position on a corporate coupon bond.
The option approach we propose for pricing bonds illiquidity is reminiscent of the celebrated
work of Longstaff (1995) on the non-marketability of some non-dividend-paying shares in IPOs.
This approach describes a quite common situation in the fixed income market: it is rather usual
to find issuers that, besides liquid benchmark bonds, issue some other bonds that either are
placed to a small number of investors in private placements or have a limited issue size.
The model considers interest rate and credit spread term structures and their dynamics. We
show that illiquid bonds present an additional liquidity spread that depends on the time-to-
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A closed formula for illiquid corporate bonds
and an application to the European market
1 Introduction
The natural question that arises when dealing with liquidity is: “How long does it take to liquidate a
given position?”. Despite the relevance of this question, not only has there not yet appeared, in the
financial industry, a unique modeling framework, but not even a standard language for addressing
liquidity. Unfortunately liquidity problems are, in general, really complicated. There are several
aspects of asset liquidity, including tightness (i.e. bid–ask spread, the transaction cost incurred
in case of a small liquidation), market impact (i.e. the average response of prices to a trade, see,
e.g. Bouchaud et al. (2008)), market elasticity (i.e. how rapidly a market regenerates the liquidity
removed by a trade) and the time-to-liquidate a position. In this paper we focus on corporate bonds.
In the literature, few are the models available for corporate bonds: the main modeling approach has
been introduced by Jarrow (2001) that view illiquidity as an exogenously determined component in
bond yield in addition to the default risk component; significant evidence has been found for this
component in the corporate bond spread due to illiquidity (see, e.g. Longstaff et al. 2005, Dick-Nielsen
et al. 2012).
Traditional liquidity measures have been developed for the equity market within Market Impact
Models (see, e.g. Lillo et al. 2003, Bouchaud et al. 2008, Gatheral 2010, and references therein) with
a particular focus on stocks with larger capitalization: execution typically takes place in a timeframe
from minutes to hours, only in some cases within a horizon of a few days. However these liquidity
measures are not applicable to securities, such as many corporate bonds, that do not trade on a
regular basis. In this case a complete representation of asset liquidity could be not feasible, for
several reasons, such as i) the market is still largely OTC and bid–ask quotes are not available for
many corporate bonds2 ii) trading costs often decrease with trade size (see, e.g. Edwards et al. 2007)
and iii) the time-to-liquidate a position can be some weeks, or even months, in some cases.3 Moreover
the bond market can be very differentiated even for the same issuing institution: some bonds can be
very illiquid while some others, even with similar characteristics (e.g. the same time to maturity),
trade every day, with trading activity far from being uniform over time but mostly concentrated on
recently issued bonds (‘on-the-run’ issues).
Focus on the bond market liquidity was boosted following the regulatory effort to introduce more
transparency in the bond market. In the U.S.A., starting from the 1st of July, 2002, information on
the prices and the volumes of completed transactions have been publicly disclosed for a significant
set of corporate bonds. The National Association of Security Dealers (NASD, and after July 2007
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA) mandated transparency in the corporate bond
2Practitioners well know that publicly disclosed quotes are often not true commitments to trade at that price but
rather just indications (i.e. ‘indicative’ quotes).
3In the corporate bond market a difference of some orders of magnitude with respect to large cap stocks is observed:
“a typical US large cap stock, say Apple as of November 2007, had a daily turnover of around 8bn USD” with an
“average of 6 transactions per second and on the order of 100 events per second affecting the order book” (see Bouchaud
et al. 2008, p. 76).
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market through the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) program; under TRACE,
all trades for corporate bonds in USD must be reported within 15 minutes of execution (see, e.g.
Bessembinder et al. 2006, Dick-Nielsen et al. 2012, and references therein). Thanks to the transac-
tional data provided by TRACE, Schestag et al. (2016) were able to apply to the bond market eight
competing liquidity measures4 and to benchmark the effectiveness of thirteen liquidity proxies that
only need daily information. On the basis of TRACE data for a period of eight year (2002-2010),
Helwege et al. (2014) draw some relevant conclusions on liquidity premium: once they control for
the credit risk component of the bond price thanks to the measure of the difference in the spreads
between pairs of bonds with the same characteristics5, they can measure the sheer liquidity premium,
and they find that it is time-varying and related to systematic risk.
The impact following the introduction of the TRACE program on bond market liquidity was mixed,
as discussed by Asquith et al. (2013), with a decrease in daily price standard deviation, but also a
parallel marked decrease in trading activity. Such evolution drove the slump of fixed-income revenues
and the decline in profits of large dealers (see, e.g. Bessembinder et al. 2006).
In Europe, the observed evolution in the U.S.A. bond market after the introduction of TRACE has
caused a lively debate within European institutions (Glover 2014), with consequent delay in the
enforcement of mandatory transparency rules in the European Union. After several years of haggling
between policy makers, the ruling of bond market transparency has been included within the update
of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (also known as MiFID II) approved in April 2014
and binding since January 2018. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is in
charge of collecting transaction data from dealers and disclose information on bond liquidity. Since
compulsory data collection started in January 2018, it is too early to draw significant conclusions
from the analysis of time series of ESMA transaction data. However, recently a team of ESMA
economists (De Renzis et al. 2018) has analyzed liquidity in the most liquid segment of the EU
corporate bond market on the basis of a transactional dataset. 6 They analyze the overall liquidity
of the European bond market and their conclusion confirms the mixed results observed in the U.S.A.
market by Asquith et al. (2013). In particular they show, in line with the results of Galliani et al.
(2014), that the liquidity is positively related to the outstanding amount and negatively related with
measures of market volatility with statistical significance.
The econometric analyses both in the U.S.A and in Europe show evidence of a split market, with
large differences in the liquidity of debt securities traded in the same marketplace and this points to
a relevant research question, i.e. the estimation of the sheer liquidity premium represented by the
difference in price between comparable bonds which differ only in term of market liquidity. Moreover,
in a framework where the effectiveness of econometric techniques is hampered by the sparsity of trades
and by non-stationary data (see, e.g. Helwege et al. 2014), we deem useful to resort to a theoretical
model that distinguishes between the credit and liquidity component of the spread and clarifies the
impact of volatility on the liquidity component. Clearly, it is crucial in this context to have a model
price for illiquid coupon bonds that takes into account, with a parsimonious modeling approach,
a precise measure of illiquidity. In this paper we simplify significantly the problem for corporate
coupon bonds by addressing just one single aspect of market liquidity: the time-to-liquidate a given
4Six transaction cost measures, one price impact measure, and one price dispersion measure.
5Same issuer, same coupon type and both coupon amount and maturity within a narrow range.
6Markit EUR iBoxx Corporate database representing the segment of the 40 most liquid European corporate bonds.
This database includes only the most liquid segment in the Investment Grade market for a time-window of 2 years.
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position (hereinafter ttl), and we propose a closed formula for the liquidity component of corporate
bond spreads defined as the difference in bond yields between a bond with limited liquidity and a very
liquid bond of the same issuer. This approach presents several advantages: liquidity is considered an
intrinsic characteristic of each single issue, it can vary over time and it depends on the size. Liquidity
is expressed in terms of a price discount (or equivalently in terms of a liquidity spread) as a simple
closed formula of a single one-dimensional parameter, the ttl. This is the time lag that, at a given
value date and for a given size, an experienced trader needs to liquidate the position.
This problem is reminiscent of the celebrated work of Longstaff (1995) on the non-marketability
of some non-dividend-paying shares in IPOs. More recently, Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) tackle a
similar problem in the case of a risk-free zero-coupon (ZC) bond with maturity T. In this paper
we propose an alternative modeling approach that allows an extension to default risk and coupon
payments, the most common situation in the fixed income market.
We consider an application to the European market, where the problem of pricing illiquidity is
even more significant than in the U.S. market, due to the differences in mandatory transparency
requirements explained above. European companies had the equivalent of about 8.4 trillion of bonds
outstanding in various currencies in May 2014, up from 6.3 trillion at the beginning of 2008 (Glover
2014), so that the European bond market is almost as large as that of the U.S. Moreover, in Europe,
it is relatively frequent to observe private placements to institutional investors, where a single issue is
detained by a very limited pool of bondholders, and, especially in the financial sector, there are several
bonds with small issue sizes aimed either at retail investors or at private-banking clients of a banking
institution. Often no market price is available in these cases. For these reasons, the calibration of a
liquidity model, especially in Europe, is often a challenging task. The proposed formula, besides bond
characteristics (maturity, coupon, sinking features, etc...), depends on standard market quantities,
such as i) the observed risk-free interest curve ii) issuers credit spread term-structure and iii) bond
volatility. We show model calibration at a given value date t0 for two European issuers in the financial
sector and the liquidity spread curves that are obtained for different values of the time-to-liquidate.
The contributions of this paper to the existing literature on illiquid coupon bonds are threefold.
First, it provides a simple closed formula for illiquid corporate coupon bonds that relates the time-
to-liquidate a position and bond volatility to the price difference with respect of the corresponding
liquid bond. Second, it clarifies, via a detailed calibration on some examples in the European market,
the relevance of a parsimonious modeling approach and the relative importance of model parameters
in liquidity spread. Third, it allows quantifying the liquidity impact in terms of prices for corporate
debt of an insufficiently transparent market and it suggests some policy implications: this study
highlights the importance of implementing a post-trade transparency in which the dissemination
of information (trade time, volume, and price) should be extended to all corporate bonds. Having
transparent market information on both liquid and less liquid bonds with similar characteristics
would allow a complete quantification of the liquidity impact on corporate prices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model set-up and
the liquidity problem formulation. In Section 3 we deduce the closed formula and in Section 4 we
show how to calibrate the model parameters on real market data for two European bond issuers. In
Section 5 we make some concluding remarks.
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2 The model
The modeling framework includes two main sets of financial ingredients: we should i) outline the
model set-up for corporate bonds, introducing the interest rate and the credit components, and ii)
describe how illiquidity affects corporate bond prices. Then, we need to specify the interest rate and
the credit dynamics in line with the parsimony requirement, as discussed in the Introduction: our
aim is to model as parsimoniously as possible, due to lack of an abundance of accurate data sources.
This section is divided into three parts. The first subsection is devoted to describing the model
set-up for corporate bonds, while in the following we focus on the modeling of illiquidity. In the last
subsection we specify the dynamics for interest rates and the credit spreads. In each subsection we
present and discuss one of the main modeling assumptions.
2.1 The model set-up
We model interest rates and credits according to a zero-recovery model: default for an obligor C (the
issuer of interest) is modeled via a Cox process Nt with intensity λt, while the risk free interest rate
rt follows a continuous dynamics. In this subsection we briefly describe the notation, we introduce
the Defaultable HJM model via Assumption 1, we present the corporate coupon bond within this
model and we define the simplest derivative contract: the defaultable forward ZC bond.
The notation is close to the one used in standard textbooks (see, e.g. Scho¨nbucher 2003, Ch.6).
We choose the value date t0 = 0. We consider the background filtration (Gt)(t≥0) generated by a
d-dimensional Brownian motion Wt, with dW
(j)
t dW
(l)
t = ρjl dt for j, l = 1, · · · , d and ρ ∈ <d×d the
instantaneous correlation matrix. The risk-free interest rate rt and the intensity λt are processes
adapted to (Gt)(t≥0). Default for an obligor C is modeled via a Cox process Nt with intensity λt,
i.e. conditional on the background filtration (Gt)(t≥0), Nt is an inhomogeneous Poisson process with
intensity λt. The quantity dNt indicates the number of jumps between t− and t: it is equal to 1 if
a jump occurs and zero otherwise. We define
(FNt )(t≥0) to be the filtration generated by Nt. The
full filtration is obtained by combining this one and the background filtration (see, e.g. Scho¨nbucher
2003):
(Ft)(t≥0) = (Gt)(t≥0) ∨
(FNt )(t≥0) . (1)
Market practitioners model corporate bond spreads via Zeta-spreads: this is equivalent, from a
modeling perspective, to considering zero recovery and to stating that the default probability models
the whole credit risk for the obligor C. In particular we consider a zero-recovery model as a limit
case of a fractional recovery model. A defaultable ZC with Fractional Recovery (FR) between time
t and maturity T , Bq(t, T ), is the price of a defaultable ZC where, if a default occurs at td, the value
of the defaultable asset is 1− q times its pre-default value, with 0 < q < 1, i.e.
Bq(td, T ) = (1− q)Bq(td−, T ) .
A defaultable ZC with zero recovery can be seen as a particular case of a ZC with FR when q tends
to 1 from below (see, e.g. Scho¨nbucher 2003). Often, it is simpler to use this modeling perspective
for a generic q and then consider the limit for q close to 1. This is the approach we follow in this
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paper. Risk-free ZC B(t0, T ) and defaultable ZC (with zero recovery) B(t0, T ) := Bq=1−(td, T ) are
related to the default time td and the stochastic discount D(t0, T ) := exp−
(∫ T
t0
rsds
)
via{
B(t0, T ) := E [D(t0, T )|F0]
B(t0, T ) := E [D(t0, T )1td>T |F0] .
(2)
The model we consider in this paper is a generalization of the model of Heath et al. (1992) to the
defaultable case (Scho¨nbucher 1998, Duffie and Singleton 1999) and it is called the Defaultable HJM
model (hereinafter, DHJM).
Assumption 1:(DHJM).
The following dynamics under the risk-neutral measure are assumed for the risk-free ZC and the
defaultable ZC for every t ∈ (0, T ]
dB(t, T )
B(t, T )
:= rt dt+ σ(t, T ) · dWt
dBq(t, T )
Bq(t−, T )
:= (rt + qλt)dt+ σ(t, T ) · dWt − q dNt
(3)
with B(t0, T ) and Bq(t0, T ) their initial conditions at value date t0. The instantaneous rate rt and
the intensity λt satisfy
rt := −∂ lnB(t0, t)
∂t
+
1
2
∫ t
t0
∂
∂t
σ(s, t)2 ds−
∫ t
t0
∂
∂t
σ(s, t) · dWs
rt + qλt := −∂ lnBq(t0, t)
∂t
+
1
2
∫ t
t0
∂
∂t
σ(s, t)2 ds−
∫ t
t0
∂
∂t
σ(s, t) · dWs .
(4)
where the volatilities σ(t, T ) and σ(t, T ) are d-dimensional vectors of deterministic functions of time
with σ(T, T ) = σ(T, T ) = 0 ∈ <d. We indicate with x · y the scalar product between two vectors
x, y ∈ <d and with x2 the scalar product x · ρx, x ∈ <d.
DHJM focuses on the Zero recovery case B(t, T ) with q = 1− ♦
In the DHJM, the main relation between the defaultable ZC and stochastic discount is
B(t0, T ) = E
[
D(t0, T )|G0
]
where D(t0, T ) := exp
(
− ∫ T
t0
(rs + λs)ds
)
is called the defaultable stochastic discount.
With Assumption 1 it is possible to model exactly the features of a default with Fractional Recovery.
Considering a realization of the processes between t0 and t and using the Generalized Itoˆ lemma (see,
e.g. Appendix A), we get that the value of the defaultable ZC at a generic time t starting from the
initial condition is
B(t, T ) = B(t0, T ) (1− q)Nt exp
{∫ t
t0
[
rs + qλs − 1
2
σ2(s, T )
]
ds+
∫ t
t0
σ(s, T ) · dWs
}
.
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Thus, the default of B(t, T ) occurs when the Poisson process jumps and the jump size is
∆B(t, T ) = B(t, T )−B(t−, T ) = −B(t−, T ) q dNt
i.e. the ZC loses a fraction q of its pre-default value; in particular the case with q = 1− describes the
Zero-recovery model we are interested in.
In this study we focus on fixed rate bonds that are not callable, puttable, or convertible. A corporate
coupon bond of the obligor C at value date t0 = 0 is
P (t0, T ; c, t) :=
N∑
i=1
ciB(t0, ti) . (5)
In the definition of a corporate coupon bond (5), the price depends on the set of flows c := {ci}i=1,··· ,N
and the set of payment dates t := {ti}i=1,··· ,N . The ith payment ci at time ti for i < N is the coupon
payment with the corresponding daycount, while the last payment at tN = T has the bond face value
added to the coupon payment. A corporate coupon bond P always indicates invoice (or dirty) prices,
as in standard fixed income modeling.
We conclude this subsection introducing the simplest derivative contract. Let us define the forward
defaultable ZC bond and its main properties in the DHJM.
Definition 2.1. The forward defaultable ZC bond at time t is a derivative contract with a reference
obligor C and with three times t, τ and T s.t. t ≤ τ ≤ T . This forward contract is characterized by
the payment in τ of{
B(t; τ, T ) if the obligor C has not defaulted up to time τ and
0 otherwise
in order to receive 1 in T if the obligor C has not defaulted up to time T (and zero otherwise). The
amount B(t; τ, T ), also called forward defaultable ZC bond price, is established in t ♦
In Figure 1 we show the flows that characterize a forward defaultable ZC bond.
Lemma 2.2. The forward defaultable ZC bond price is related to a defaultable ZC via
B(t; τ, T ) =
B(t, T )
B(t, τ)
. (6)
Proof. See Appendix A.
From Definition 2.1 of a forward defaultable ZC, we observe that B(τ ; τ, T ) = B(τ, T ), i.e. the
forward defaultable bond price tends to the default bond price as time t tends to τ . We indicate
with P (t; τ, T ; c, t) the forward defaultable coupon bond corresponding to (5); clearly in the forward
P (t; τ, T ; c, t), only coupons with payment dates ti > τ appear.
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Figure 1: We show the flows that characterize a forward defaultable ZC bond paid at τ if no default event
occurs up to τ . A forward defaultable ZC price is established at time t. The contract gives the right to
receive 1 if no default event occurs up to T .
Lemma 2.3. In the DHJM, the dynamics for the forward defaultable ZC is
dB(t; τ, T )
B(t−; τ, T )
=
dB(t; τ, T )
B(t; τ, T )
= [σ(t, T )− σ(t, τ)] · [dWt + ρ σ(t, τ) dt] t ∈ [0, τ ] (7)
or equivalently
B(t; τ, T ) = B(t0; τ, T ) exp
{
−1
2
∫ t
t0
[
σ2(s, T )− σ2(s, τ)] ds+ ∫ t
t0
[σ(s, T )− σ(s, τ)] · dWs
}
. (8)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The above lemma states that the dynamics of the forward defaultable ZC bond price is continuous
and it is, mutatis mutandis, the same as the corresponding dynamics for a risk-free ZC (see, e.g.
Musiela and Rutkowski 2006).
Lemma 2.4. In the DHJM, the defaultable stochastic discount between t and τ ≥ t D(t, τ) is related
to the corresponding defaultable ZC via the relation
D(t, τ) = B(t, τ) exp
{
−1
2
∫ τ
t
σ2(s, τ) ds+
∫ τ
t
σ(s, τ) · dWs
}
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.4 correspond to the two standard properties of HJM models (see, e.g.
Musiela and Rutkowski 2006); these properties also hold in the case of defaultable bonds described
by Assumption 1. Hereinafter, we consider Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 only in the limit q ↗ 1 that
corresponds to the Zero-recovery model we are interested in.
A consequence of these two lemmas is that it is possible to introduce a τ -defaultable-forward measure
(hereinafter also τ -forward measure), s.t. the process
W
(τ)
t := Wt +
∫ t
t0
ρ σ(s, τ) ds
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is a d-dimensional Brownian motion under the new forward measure. We indicate with E(τ) [ • ] the
expectation under the τ -forward measure. In the τ -forward measure, B(t; τ, T ) is a martingale, and
the dynamics for the forward defaultable ZC has a particularly simple form:
dB(t; τ, T ) = B(t; τ, T ) v(t; τ, T ) · dW (τ)t (9)
with v(t; τ, T ) := σ(t, T )− σ(t, τ).
In the next subsection we describe the modeling framework on how illiquidity affects corporate
coupon bonds (5).
2.2 Problem formulation
Let us consider a hypothetical investor who holds, at value date t0 = 0, an illiquid corporate bond
(5), i.e. he needs some time in order to liquidate a position with a given size of that bond. We assume
that this investor is an experienced trader with a better information than other market players on that
particular corporate market segment at value date t0: he is able to sell the position in the illiquid
bond after a time-to-liquidate τ at the same price as a liquid bond with the same characteristics
(issuer, coupons, payment dates); we assume that this experienced trader knows all the features of
the bonds of that issuer and all the potential clients that could be interested in buying the bond he
holds.
After the seminal paper of Kyle (1985) the assumption that some market players are better informed
than the other agents is rather common when analyzing from a theoretical perspective specific trading
mechanisms and the price formation process of some assets. In particular, this liquidity problem is
reminiscent of the celebrated work of Longstaff (1995), which compares with an option approach
the value at t0 of an illiquid security with that of a liquid one with equal future cash flows after
τ ; as an example, Longstaff (1995) focuses attention on a non-dividend paying stock in IPOs. An
additional feature characterizes the hypothetical investor in Longstaff (1995): he is able to sell the
liquid security “with perfect timing” during [t0, τ ]. Also in this paper the experienced trader holds a
perfect market timing ability: he is able to sell the liquid asset “when the price of the security reaches
its maximum” (cf. Longstaff 1995, p.1768) if the issuer does not default before the time-to-liquidate
τ and to sell it at value date otherwise. The additional value of the liquid security over the illiquid
one is calculated by regarding the optimal strategy of this hypothetical investor.
More recently, Longstaff’s results have been extended by Koziol and Sauerbier (2007), who tackle a
similar problem in the case of a risk free zero coupon bond with maturity T . The authors consider
the illiquidity premium in the case of a risk-free short rate which follows a Vasicek (1977) model; the
ZC is modeled as a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) process, similarly to the stocks in Longstaff
(1995). The ZC can be traded at a given set of dates, established at value date t0; the illiquidity
price in their study is obtained via a (numerically intense) Monte Carlo technique. Unfortunately,
as already mentioned in the Introduction, the approach of Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) can not be
extended easily to the case of interest. In this paper we consider a coupon bearing bond in the
presence of credit risk: we obtain illiquid bond prices via a simple closed formula.
Hence, when dealing with fixed income securities, we have to consider that bonds pay coupons and
that they can default. Two are the cases of interest: either the corporate issuer defaults after the
time-to-liquidate τ or it defaults before τ .
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In the former case, in order to compare two assets with the same future cash flows at τ it is better
to consider the corresponding forward security introduced in previous subsection. The selling price
for the experienced trader, able to sell the forward coupon bond with optimal timing, is
Mτ := max
t0≤t≤τ
P (t; τ, T ; c, t) ;
this price is paid at time τ as in the forward defaultable bond case.
In the latter case, the illiquid position, due to the zero recovery, has a value equal to zero in τ (and
then also in the value date); the liquid bond is sold immediately at its price at value date P (t0; c, t).
As we show in the numerical example in section 4, the contribution of this term is smaller than the
others for some orders of magnitude. Let us recall that a default event in such a narrow time interval
is very rare, since i) the time-to-liquidity is few months in the most illiquid cases and some weeks
more generally, and ii) the typical corporate issuer we are considering in this study, with both liquid
and illiquid issues, is investment grade.
Summing up the two possibilities for the liquid and illiquid bonds are
liquid illiquid
td ≤ τ P (t0; c, t) 0 paid in t0
td > τ Mτ P (τ ; c, t) paid in τ
Longstaff’s idea is very intuitive: the main limitation of holding an illiquid bond, compared with a
comparable issue of the same corporate entity, is related to the impossibility for a while to sell the
bond and convert its value into cash. The time-to-liquidate is the main exogenous model parameter:
it models the liquidity restriction as an opportunity cost for this hypothetical investor.
Assumption 2:(Illiquidity price).
The illiquidity price ∆τ is defined as the value at t0 of the difference between liquid and illiquid
prices. Its present value equals
∆τ := E
[
D(t0, τ)1td>τ
(
Mτ − P (τ, T ; c, t)
)
+ 1td≤τP (t0; c, t)|F0
] ♦ (10)
Thus, according to the Longstaff criteria, the illiquidity price is defined as the difference, for the
hypothetical investor, of the selling prices of the liquid and illiquid forward asset prices plus a
correction in the (rare) event of issuer default before the time-to-liquidate.
Remark 2.5. The above definition does not consider the case when coupon payments take place
between the value date t0 and τ . We have already underlined that the time-to-liquidate is, even
in the most illiquid cases, a few months, and then at most one coupon payment could be present
in the time interval (t0, τ). The first coupon, when paid before τ , can be separated by the other
flows in the coupon bond; a technique known in the market place as coupon stripping. In practice,
corporate bond traders consider that payment, i.e. within a short lag in the future, very liquid. We
assume that this coupon makes the same contribution to both the liquid and illiquid coupon bonds,
i.e. maintains only its interest rate and credit risk components; thus, this coupon does not appear
in the illiquidity price ∆τ in (10). Hereinafter, we consider in the corporate coupon bond only the
coupons after the time-to-liquidate, i.e. in definition (5) the first coupon in the sum is the first one
paid after τ .
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Lemma 2.6. Within the DHJM model of Assumption 1, the price of illiquidity is equal to
∆τ = E
[
D(t0, τ)Mτ |G0
]− E [D(t0, τ)P (τ, T ; c, t)|G0]+ (1− P(t0, τ))P (t0; c, t) =
= B(t0, τ)
{
E(τ) [Mτ |G0]− E(τ)
[
P (τ, T ; c, t)|G0
]}
+ (1− P(t0, τ))P (t0; c, t) .
(11)
where P(t0, τ) is the issuer survival probability up to the time-to-liquidate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Hence, we have shown that illiquidity price ∆τ depends on a sum of relatively simple terms apart
from E(τ) [Mτ |G0]. Even this term can be computed with a closed formula, once we select a model
within the class of DHJM, as done in the Assumption 3 discussed in the next subsection.
2.3 A parsimonious model selection
Let us observe that the quantity E(τ) [Mτ |G0] in the price of illiquidity ∆τ (11) does not depend
separately on rt and λt, but depends only on their combination
rt := rt + λt .
This property holds for whichever DHJM model is selected (i.e. whatever σ(t, T ) and σ(t, T ) are
chosen) for the dynamics (3) of the risk-free ZC curve B(t, T ) and the defaultable ZC curve B(t, T ).
As discussed in the Introduction, the main driver for model selection is parsimony when dealing with
illiquid corporate bonds, due to the poorness of the data set and model calibration issues. One of
the simplest models within this set was proposed by Scho¨nbucher (2000), where both rt and λt follow
two correlated 1-dimensional Hull and White (1990) models{
rt = ϕt + x
(1)
t
λt = ψt + x
(2)
t
where x
(1)
t and x
(2)
t are two correlated Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) processes with zero mean and zero
initial value; ϕt and ψt are two deterministic functions of time. This model has the main advantage
of allowing an elementary separate calibration of the zero-rates (via ϕt) and the Zeta-spread (via
ψt). A consequence of the observation that only the dynamics for rt matters for liquidity, makes us
consider an even simpler model with only one OU driver, as stated in the following assumption.
Assumption 3:(Parsimonious dynamics).
We model the risk-free interest rate rt and the intensity λt as{
rt = ϕt + (1− γˆ) xt
λt = ψt + γˆ xt
(12)
with ϕt, ψt two deterministic functions of time and xt an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) process with zero
mean and initial value {
dxt = −aˆ xt dt+ σˆ dWt
x0 = 0
11
where γˆ ∈ [0, 1], while aˆ, σˆ are two positive constant parameters ♦
This assumption is in line with day-to-day practice. In the marketplace, often one cannot observe
derivative instruments that allow calibrating separately the volatility of the risk-free curve and the
volatility of the credit spread, and there is not enough information to discriminate between the two
dynamics. One can associate a fraction γˆ of the total dynamics to the credit component and the
remaining fraction to the interest rate component. Conversely, the two initial curves (risk-free zero-
rate and Zeta-spread) can be easily calibrated separately on market data and the integrals of ϕt, ψt
between t0 and a given maturity T are related to these two curves up to T . We do not report these
relations here because we provide final formulas in terms of B(t0, T ) and B(t0, T ), and both curves
can be calibrated directly from market data.
A consequence of Assumption 3 is that the rate rt
rt = ϕt + ψt + xt
is modeled according to a Hull–White (HW) model with volatility (see, e.g. Brigo and Mercurio 2007)
σ(t, T ) =
σˆ
aˆ
(
1− e−aˆ(T−t)) ∈ < t ≤ T (13)
and then the volatility v(t; τ, ti) = σ(t, ti) − σ(t, τ), defined in equation (9), is a separable function
in the times t and ti, i.e.
v(t; τ, ti) = ζi ν(t) (14)
with ζi := (σˆ/aˆ)
[
1− e−aˆ(ti−τ)] and ν(t) := e−aˆ(τ−t) with t0 ≤ t ≤ τ ≤ ti.
In the next section we show that, under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, it is possible to compute the price
of illiquidity ∆τ via a closed formula and it is possible to associate a liquidity spread as a component
of the corporate bond spread in addition to the credit spread.
3 A closed formula for illiquid corporate coupon bonds
In this section we present the main result of this paper: the illiquidity price ∆τ (10) can be evaluated
directly via a simple closed formula obtained using valuation techniques from option-pricing theory.
This result is far from being obvious. A defaultable forward coupon bond P (t; τ, T ; c, t) is the sum of
forward defaultable ZCs {B(t; τ, ti)}i=1,··· ,N , each one following the dynamics (7) and then described
as a GBM (8). No known closed formula exists for the running maximum of a sum of GBMs.
In order to get the closed formula, we take the following steps. First we prove that a lower and an
upper bound of (10) can be computed via closed formulas. Then we show, calibrating the model
parameters for two European issuers, that the difference between the upper and lower bounds is
negligible for all practical purposes. We can then use one of the two bounds as the closed-form
solution we are looking for; in this section we prove the existence of these bounds and in the next
section we show the tightness of their difference.
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Lemma 3.1. The following inequalities hold:∑
i
ciB(t
∗; τ, ti) ≤ max
t∈[t0,τ ]
{∑
i
ciB(t; τ, ti)
}
≤
∑
i
ci max
t∈[t0,τ ]
B(t; τ, ti) ∀t∗ ∈ [t0, τ ], ti ≥ τ
where the sum over i is limited to all coupons with payment date ti larger than τ .
Proof. The left inequality is obvious since the maximum value of a function on the time interval [t0, τ ]
is greater than the same function’s values at any other time t∗ in the interval. The right inequality
is due to the fact that the maximum of a sum is less than or equal to the sum of the maxima ♣
In particular we can choose t∗ equal to the time-location
t∗ = min
{
t′
∣∣∣∣B(t′; τ, tN) = maxt∈[t0,τ ]B(t; τ, tN)
}
, (15)
i.e. equal to the (first) time when the last forward ZC, B(t; τ, tN), reaches its maximum in the
interval [t0, τ ].
In the next theorem we prove that the expected values of these lower and upper bounds have a simple
form; in Section 4 we show that they can be considered equal for all practical purposes.
Theorem 3.2. Lower and upper bounds for the illiquidity price ∆τ (10) are:
N∑
i=1
ciB(t0, ti)
(
piLi (τ)− P(t0, τ)
) ≤ ∆τ ≤ N∑
i=1
ciB(t0, ti)
(
piUi (τ)− P(t0, τ)
)
where the sum is limited to the payment dates ti > τ and
piUi (τ) :=
4 + Σ2i (τ)
2
Φ
(
Σi(τ)
2
)
+
Σi(τ)√
2pi
exp
(
−Σ
2
i (τ)
8
)
piLi (τ) :=
∫ 1
0
dη
e−
1
8
Σ2N (τ)
pi
√
1− η√η e
− η
2
Σi(τ) (Σi(τ)−ΣN (τ)){
1 +
√
pi (1− η)
2
ΣN(τ) e
1−η
8
Σ2N (τ) Φ
[√
1− η
2
ΣN(τ)
]}
{
1 +
√
pi η
2
(2 Σi(τ)− ΣN(τ)) e
η
8
(2 Σi(τ)−ΣN (τ))2 Φ
[√
η
2
(2 Σi(τ)− ΣN(τ))
]}
(16)
The cumulated volatility is
Σ2i (τ) :=
∫ τ
t0
v2(s; τ, ti) ds = ζ
2
i
1− e−2aˆ(τ−t0)
2aˆ
where ζi is defined in equation (14), Φ[•] is the standard normal CDF and the issuer survival proba-
bility up to the time-to-liquidate is
P(t0, τ) = exp
{
−
∫ τ
t0
ψsds− 1
2
γˆ2
∫ τ
t0
σ2(s, τ) ds
}
, (17)
with ψs the deterministic part of the intensity introduced in (12) and σ(s, τ) is defined in (13).
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Proof. See Appendix A.
This theorem is the key result of this paper: it indicates a lower and an upper bound for the price of
illiquidity ∆τ . In Section 4 we show for two issuers that these bounds appear to be very tight, being
on the order of 10−6 the face value in the worst case: their difference can be considered negligible for
all practical purposes.
We can understand the two main reasons why this result holds. On the one hand, a forward coupon
bond is the sum of forward ZCs which have different weights ci with the last one cN (that contains
the face value) generally two orders of magnitude larger than the others. On the other hand, the
ith forward ZC, in the forward coupon bond P (t, T ; c, t), follows a GBM whose maximum over time
takes place at
tmaxi := argmax
t∈[t0,τ ]
[
−ζi
2
∫ t
t0
ν2(s) ds+
∫ t
t0
ν(s) dW (τ)(s)
]
.
Let us observe that, in the above expression, the stochastic part is exactly the same ∀i and differs only
for the ζi term in the deterministic drift part, where ζi is, once one considers parameters calibrated
with market data, smaller than all other terms and does not change significantly for the majority of
the coupon bond payment dates. Due to these two arguments, the time-location of the maximum is
exactly the same for all forward ZCs and equal to t∗ in (15) in most scenarios.
In practice, either of the two closed form solutions can be used indifferently, and in particular,
the simplest expression of the two bounds, i.e. the upper bound. This fact allows defining, in an
elementary way, a liquidity basis as done in the next subsection.
3.1 The liquidity basis
A consequence of the above theorem and of the tightness of the difference between the two bounds
is that the illiquid corporate coupon price is
P τ (t0, T ; c, t) := P (t0, T ; c, t)−∆τ =
N∑
i=1
ciB(t0, ti)
(
1 + P(t0, τ)− piUi (τ)
)
(18)
where piUi (τ) is defined in (16) and P(t0, τ) can be found in (17). We can also define an illiquid ZC
as
Bτ (t0, ti) := B(t0, ti)
(
1 + P(t0, τ)− piUi (τ)
)
and the liquidity basis
Lτ (ti) := − 1
ti − t0 ln
Bτ (t0, ti)
B(t0, ti)
= − 1
ti − t0 ln
(
1 + P(t0, τ)− piUi (τ)
)
. (19)
Thus, we can decompose the illiquid ZC bond into three components: risk-free discount, credit, and
liquidity:
Bτ (t0, T ) = e
−R(T )(T−t0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk−free
e−Z(T )(T−t0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
credit
e−Lτ (T )(T−t0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
liquidity
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where R(T ) is the Zero rate and Z(T ) is the Zeta spread. This corresponds to what is done by
practitioners in their day-to-day activities: they add a basis related to liquidity to the bond credit
spread. The main advantage of the model presented in this study is that, given the ttl for the
illiquid corporate bond position of interest, it allows associating a liquidity basis to some bond
characteristics (e.g. coupon payment dates) and to the volatility of the corresponding liquid bond,
via the two parameters aˆ and σˆ.
It is useful to underline that the liquidity basis depends mainly on the volatility parameters, and it
is only slightly affected by the credit component (but not by the rates component). The liquidity
component in the ZC price
(
1 + P(t0, τ)− piUi (τ)
)
is mainly a function of the cumulated volatility
Σi(τ).
4 An application to the financial sector in the European
bond market
In this section we illustrate the impact of illiquidity applying formula (18) to obligations with different
maturities issued by two of the main financial institutions in Europe. We also show that the difference
between the upper and lower bounds of the illiquidity price is negligible for all practical purposes.
4.1 Calibration of model parameters
The two European financial institutions in Europe that we consider in this study are BNP Paribas
S.A. (hereinafter BNPP) and Banco Santander S.A. (Santander) on 10 September 2015 (value date).
The settlement date is 14 September 2015.7 At value date, BNPP was rated A and Santander A-
according to S&P.
maturity coupon (%) clean price
27-Nov-2017 2.875 105.575
12-Mar-2018 1.500 102.768
21-Nov-2018 1.375 102.555
28-Jan-2019 2.000 104.536
23-Aug-2019 2.500 106.927
13-Jan-2021 2.250 106.083
24-Oct-2022 2.875 110.281
20-May-2024 2.375 106.007
Table 1: Clean prices for BNPP liquid bonds. Senior unsecured benchmark issues with maturity less than or
equal to 10 years. Coupons are annual with day-count convention Act/Act. Prices are end-of-day mid-prices
on 10 September 2015.
7The settlement date is equal to two business days after the value date for both the interest rate and credit products
in the Euro-zone.
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maturity coupon (%) clean price
27-Mar-2017 4.000 105.372
04-Oct-2017 4.125 107.358
15-Jan-2018 1.750 102.766
20-Apr-2018 0.625 99.885
14-Jan-2019 2.000 103.984
13-Jan-2020 0.875 99.500
24-Jan-2020 4.000 112.836
14-Jan-2022 1.125 98.166
10-Mar-2025 1.125 93.261
Table 2: Clean prices for Santander senior unsecured benchmark issues with maturity less than or equal
to 10 years. Coupons are annual with day-count convention Act/Act. Prices are end-of-day mid-prices at
value date.
As discussed in Section 3, the closed formula for illiquid bond prices, besides the bond characteristics
(maturity, payment dates, coupons, sinking features, time-of-liquidate, etc...), includes the observed
i) zero-rate curve, ii) credit spread term-structure for the issuer of interest, and iii) bond volatility.
These “ingredients” can be calibrated with the market data following standard techniques.
First, the risk-free curve we consider is the OIS curve as the market standard; it has been boot-
strapped from OIS quoted rates. Quotes at value date are provided by Bloomberg. The discount
curve B(t0, T ) is bootstrapped following the standard procedure; OIS rates and discount factors are
reported in Baviera (2017).
Second, in order to construct the Zeta-spread curve, i.e. the (liquid) credit component in the spread,
we consider all senior unsecured benchmark issues (i.e. with issue size larger than e500 million) with
maturity less than or equal to 10 years. Coupons are paid annually with the Act/Act day-count
convention for all bonds in both sets. The closing day mid-prices are reported in Tables 1 and 2.
For each one of the two issuers, its time-dependent Zeta-spread curve
Z(T ) := − 1
T − t0 ln
B(t0, T )
B(t0, T )
can be bootstrapped from liquid bond invoice prices (see, e.g. Scho¨nbucher 2003). Invoice prices are
obtained adding the accrual to the clean price. We assume a constant Zeta-spread curve up to the
maturity of the bond with the lowest maturity and we use a linear interpolation rule on Zeta-spread
afterwards; the day-count convention for Zeta-spreads is Act/365, as the market standard.
Finally, the volatility parameters (aˆ, σˆ and γˆ) should be calibrated on options on corporate bonds.
Unfortunately, prices on liquid options on BNPP and Santander bonds are not available in the market
at value date. We consider a proxy in order to calibrate the volatility parameters; we notice that at
value date both banks are Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) and belong to the
panel of banks contributing to the Euribor rate. The dynamics of the spread between the Euribor
and the OIS curve can be considered a good proxy of the dynamics of the average credit spread for
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financial institutions with the above characteristics. As mentioned in Grbac and Runggaldier (2015),
this spread models the risk related to the Euro interbank market, and default risk is one important
component of this interbank risk. Let us underline that we use this proxy to calibrate only volatility
parameters, while credit spreads are calibrated on issuer liquid bond market.
ATM swaptions on Euribor swap rates are very liquid in Europe: we can use these OTC option
contracts at t0 as a proxy, in order to calibrate the volatility parameters. Swaption ATM normal
volatilities are provided by Bloomberg; their values in t0 and the calibration procedure are reported
in Baviera (2017). Calibrated values are aˆ = 12.94%, σˆ = 1.26% and γˆ = 0.04%.
In the two cases analyzed, as already mentioned in Section 2, the correction to include the default
risk up to ttl is small. All survival probabilities P(t0, τ) are close to 1: we report in Table 3 the
default probabilities 1− P(t0, τ) in the time interval of interest. All values are of order 10−4.
BNPP Santander
2w 1.27× 104 1.80× 104
2m 5.42× 104 7.73× 104
Table 3: Default probabilities 1−P(t0, τ) for BNPP and Santander for the two ttl of 2 weeks and 2 months.
The correction due to the default risk up to ttl is negligible in the liquidity spread: this fact justifies
the decomposition of the bond spread in the three components risk-free, credit and liquidity proposed
in Section 3.1.
4.2 Illiquid bond prices
In this section we show that, considering two sets of illiquid bonds with the same characteristics as
the liquid bonds (e.g. coupons and payments dates) and ttl equal to either two weeks or two months,
the difference between the lower and upper bounds for the illiquidity price ∆τ is on the order of 10
−8
times the face value. Figure 2 presents this difference for BNPP, and Figure 3 for Santander.
Moreover, we consider the bond with longest maturity within the Santander set (i.e. the one with
the largest difference) and in Figure 4 we plot the difference between the two bounds with ttl equal
to two months for a wide range of volatility parameters around the estimated values: aˆ ∈ (0, 30%)
and σˆ ∈ (0, 4%). We observe that this difference is, in the worst case, of less than 1 Euro for every
million of face value. This difference is the maximum error we make if we evaluate the illiquidity
price ∆τ with one of these bounds. It is negligible for all practical purposes. This fact allows us to
consider indifferently either the lower or the upper bound as a closed-form solution for ∆τ .
In Section 3 we have shown that a liquidity basis (19) could be added to each ZC in order to take
into account liquidity. Practitioners often consider a liquidity yield spread as the term that should
be added to the yield in order to obtain the illiquid bond price (18)
P τ (t0, T ; c, t) =:
N∑
i=1
ci e
−[Y(T )+Lτ (T )] (ti−t0)
where Y(T ) is the yield of the corresponding liquid bond P (t0, T ; c, t) and Lτ (T ) the liquidity yield
spread for ttl equal to τ .
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Figure 2: Difference between the upper and lower bounds for the illiquidity price ∆τ for BNPP bonds.
We consider illiquid bonds with the same characteristics (e.g. coupons, payment dates) as the bonds in
Table 1 with ttl equal to two weeks (continuous blue line and squares) and two months (dashed red line
and triangles). This difference is on the order of 10−8 times the face value in the worst-case, and so it is
negligible for all practical purposes.
Figure 3: Difference between the upper and lower bounds for the illiquidity price ∆τ for Santander bonds.
We consider illiquid bonds with the same characteristics (e.g. coupons, payment dates) as the bonds in
Table 2 with ttl equal to two weeks (continuous blue line and squares) and two months (dashed red line and
triangles). This difference is on the order of 10−9 times the face value.
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Figure 4: Difference between the upper and lower bounds for the illiquidity price ∆τ for Santander bond
with the longest maturity in Table 2 varying aˆ ∈ (0%, 30%) and σˆ ∈ (0%, 4%). We have considered a large
range of possiblle values of the two key volatility parameters around the estimated values of aˆ = 12.94% and
σˆ = 1.26%. We consider illiquid bonds with the same characteristics (e.g. coupons, payment dates) with ttl
equal to two months.
In Figures 5 and 6 we show the liquidity yield spread for BNPP and Santander for different bond
maturities and ttl equal to two weeks and two months.
Lastly, it is useful to observe that the liquidity spreads obtained with the technique described in this
paper are of the same order of magnitude of those observed in econometric studies in the U.S. market
for bonds of similar maturity (2y up to 10y) and similar ratings. For example, Dick-Nielsen et al.
report post-subprime crisis liquidity spreads in the U.S. market between 24.7 basis points (bps) and
105.4 bps for A rated issuers and between 55.0 bps and 175.1 bps for BBB (see, e.g. Dick-Nielsen
et al. 2012, table B2, panel B).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a closed formula (18) for illiquid corporate coupon bonds when
the corresponding liquid credit curve can be observed in the market for the same issuer. This
formula is obtained by bounding from above and below the illiquidity price (10). Calibrating the
model parameters with market data, we have shown that these two bounds coincide for all practical
purposes.
This formula clarifies that illiquidity is an intrinsic component of the bond spread, and hence of the
bond price. In the presence of a liquid credit curve, it is possible to disentangle the two components,
credit and liquidity, in the observed spread over the risk free rate. In particular, we have shown
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Figure 5: BNPP bond yields. We consider all benchmark issues with maturity less than 10y described in
Table 1 and their yields (continuous blue line and squares). We show also the yield obtained for illiquid
bonds with the same characteristics (e.g. coupons, payment dates) with ttl equal to two weeks (dashed red
line and triangles) and two months (dotted green line and circles).
Figure 6: Santander bond yields. We consider all benchmark issues with maturity lower than 10y in Table
2 and their yields (continuous blue line and squares). We show also the yield obtained for illiquid bonds
with the same characteristics (e.g. coupons, payment dates) with ttl equal to two weeks (dashed red line
and triangles) and ttl equal to two months (dotted green line and circles).
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that the liquidity spread depends mainly on the bond volatility and on the time-to-liquidate a given
position (via a cumulated volatility).
This closed formula (18) is very simple. Besides a set of parameters that can be easily calibrated
from liquid market data, the model includes just one additional parameter: the “time-to-liquidate”.
It can be used by practitioners for different possible applications; let us mention some of them.
This model can support traders in their day-to-day activities. On the one hand, the ttl parameter can
be evaluated ex ante by an experienced trader with a deep knowledge of the characteristics of that
particular illiquid market (concentration, frequency for similar trades with similar characteristics
observed in the recent past) who desires to liquidate a given position; the formula gives a theoretical
background for the market practice of adding a liquidity spread to the bond yields either when
pricing illiquid issues or when receiving them as collateral. On the other hand, the formula can also
be used to get an “implied time-to-liquidate” from market quotes if both liquid and illiquid prices
are available, translating observable spreads into a time lag for liquidating a position and hence
providing an interesting piece of information for market participants.
Moreover, the model can also be useful to risk managers and regulators. The ttl can be easily
backtested ex post by risk managers, who, thanks also to the transaction data made recently available,
can measure the average time needed for liquidating a position in an illiquid corporate bond of a given
size. By offering an explicit relationship between the market volatility and the liquidity premium,
it also gives a theoretical background for setting haircuts for illiquid bonds accepted as collateral in
dependence from the market volatility and offers to risk managers a way to set Vega limits on illiquid
bonds positions: the proposed approach clarifies that the cumulated volatility is the key driver of
the liquidity basis.
Lastly, this study also allows drawing some policy implications for the European bond market,
in which public reporting of trade data just started in 2018 and is currently limited to summary
information at single issue (ISIN) level. TRACE reports, for a selected set of bonds, information
about the trades executed (trade time, volume, and price) in the US market but it does not reveal
quotes. We show how the time-to-liquidate is linked by a simple, but not simplistic, model to the price
of liquidity and, in the bond market, the time-to-liquidate is the natural quantity to be estimated
from the traded volumes per unit time. We highlight therefore the relevance of public reporting of
trade volumes per unit time, since it could reduce significantly the opaqueness of the market and
hence the total cost of debt for corporate issuers.
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6 Notation and Shorthands
Symbol Description
aˆ, σˆ, γˆ parameters in short rate rt and intensity λt dynamics (12)
B(t, T ) risk-free zero-coupon (ZC) bond at t with maturity T
B(t, T ) defaultable ZC bond at t with maturity T and zero recovery
Bτ (t, T ) illiquid defaultable ZC bond at t0 with zero recovery and ttl equal to τ
B(t; τ, T ) forward ZC bond
c = {ci}i=1,...,N defaultable coupon bond flows (coupons and face value)
P (t0, T ; c, t) defaultable coupon bond at t0 with maturity T
P τ (t0, T ; c, t) illiquid defaultable coupon bond at t0 = 0 with maturity T and ttl equal to τ
P (t; τ, T ; c, t) forward defaultable coupon bond at t, paid at τ , with maturity T
P(t0, τ) issuer survival probability up to the time-to-liquidate
∆τ price of illiquidity with a ttl equal to τ
D(t, T ) stochastic discount factor, equal to exp
(
−
∫ T
t
rs ds
)
D(t, T ) defaultable stochastic discount factor, equal to exp
(
−
∫ T
t
rs ds
)
E[•] & E(τ)[•] expectation under the risk neutral & under the τ -defaultable forward measure
Ft full filtration
FNt filtration generated by Nt
Gt background filtration
q Loss-Given-Default in a FR model; q → 1− reproduces the zero-recovery model
Lτ (ti) Liquidity basis for a ZC with maturity ti
Lτ (T ) Liquidity yield spread for a coupon bond with maturity T and ttl τ
N number of defaultable bond coupons
Nt jump process that models default of the corporate issuer
λt stochastic intensity at time t
rt stochastic short rate at time t
rt defaultable short rate at time t, defined as rt + λt
ρ instantaneous correlation matrix in <d×d s.t. dW (i)t dW (j)t = ρi j dt
σ(t, T ) HJM risk-free ZC volatility between t and T in <d
σ(t, T ) HJM defaultable ZC volatility between t and T in <d
Σi(τ) cumulated volatility s.t. Σ
2
i (τ) :=
∫ τ
t0
v2(s; τ, ti) ds
t0 value date
td default time
τ time-to-liquidate (ttl)
t = {ti}i=1,...,N payment dates of the defaultable coupon bond with maturity tN ≡ T
v(t; τ, T ) equal to σ(t, T )− σ(t, τ)
Wt vector of correlated Brownian motion in <d s.t. dW (i)t dW (j)t = ρi j dt
x · y scalar product between x, y ∈ <d
x2 an abbreviation for scalar prod. x · ρx with x ∈ <d and ρ ∈ <d×d correlation
Y(T ) yield of the liquid bond P (t0, T ; c, t) with maturity T
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Shorthands
CDF : Cumulative Distribution Function
FR : fractional-recovery
DHJM : Defaultable HJM framework
GBM : Geometric Brownian motion
MiFID : Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
pdf : probability density function
s.t. : such that
ttl : time-to-liquidate
w.r.t. : with respect to
TRACE : Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine
ZC : zero-coupon
.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 2.2. It is enough to use the definition of a forward defaultable ZC and to impose
that the NPV is zero at time t (see also Figure 1)
E
[
D(t, τ)1td>τB(t; τ, T )|Ft
]
= E [D(t, T )1td>T |Ft] .
The proposition is proven after observing that B(t; τ, T ) is a known quantity at t, since the forward
price is established at time t, and using definition (2) ♣
In order to prove Lemma 2.3 we need to recall the Generalized Itoˆ Lemma (see, e.g. Jacod and
Shiryaev 2013).
The Generalized Itoˆ Lemma. Let X(t) := {X1(t), · · · , Xd(t)} a d-dimensional semimartingale
process with a finite number of jumps, Xc(t) its continuous part, and a function f : <d → <
df(X(t)) =
d∑
i=1
∂f(X−(t))
∂Xi
dXci (t) +
1
2
d∑
i,j=1
∂2f(X−(t))
∂Xi ∂Xj
〈dXci (t) dXcj (t)〉+ ∆f(X(t))
where
∆f (X(t)) = lim
h→0+
f (X(t))− f (X(t− h)) .
Proof. A formal proof can be found in Jacod and Shiryaev (2013) ♣
Proof of Lemma 2.3. A direct application of the Generalized Itoˆ Lemma, using the dynamics (3) and
equation (6) ♣
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Given the definition of D(t0, T ), this is a straightforward computation after
integrating rs + q λs in (4) for s between t0 and T and taking the limit q ↗ 1 ♣
Proof of Lemma 2.6. This is an application of Girsanov’s theorem on the risk neutral measure and
the τ -forward measure. Using Lemma 2.4, we get that
E
[
D(t, τ) • ] = B(t, τ) E(τ) [ • ]
proving the lemma ♣
The following technical lemma is needed in order to prove Theorem 3.2.
Lemma. The joint probability of i) the maximum y := max[x(t); t ∈ (0, T )] and ii) its time location
θ ∈ (0, T ), where x(t) := c t+W (t) is a 1-dimensional Wiener process with drift c t where c ∈ <, is
p(θ, y; c) =
1
pi
y√
T − θ θ3/2 e
− c2T
2
− y2
2θ
+cy
{
1−
√
2pi (T − θ) c e c
2(T−θ)
2 Φ
[
−c√T − θ
]}
with y = x(θ) > 0 and θ ∈ (0, T ).
Proof. Consider the density p(θ, y, x; c, σ2) in equation (1.5) in Shepp (1979), where x is the endpoint
x(T ). The marginal distribution is obtained by setting σ = 1 and by integrating over x ∈ (−∞, y) ♣
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Proof of Theorem 3.2. The upper bound is obvious given Lemma 3.1 and after observing that
each ZC B(t; τ, ti) in Equation (9) is a martingale under the τ -forward measure and follows a GBM
with volatility v(t; τ, ti). Thus, the expected value of the running maximum of the i
th martingale
GBM B(t; τ, ti) for t ∈ [t0, τ ] takes the form B(t0; τ, ti)piUi (τ) (see, e.g. Longstaff 1995, and references
therein).
The lower bound is the sum over i of the expected values of the B(t∗; τ, ti) computed at time t∗ s.t.
B(t∗; τ, tN) reaches its (first) maximum for a given realization of the process. In this case, using the
separability property of the volatility (14), we get
E(τ)
{
B(t∗; τ, ti)
}
= B(t0; τ, ti)E(τ)
{
exp
[
ζi
(
−1
2
ζi
∫ t∗
t0
ν2(s) ds+
∫ t∗
t0
ν(s) dW (τ)(s)
)]}
.
By means of the change of time
t˜ := t˜(t) :=
∫ t
t0
ν2(s) ds ∈ (0, τ˜)
where τ˜ stands for t˜(τ), we get dW (τ)(t˜) = ν(t) dW (τ)(t) and
E(τ)
{
B(t∗; τ, ti)
}
= B(t0; τ, ti)E(τ)
{
exp
[
ζi
(
−1
2
ζi θ +W
(τ)(θ)
)]}
= B(t0; τ, ti)E(τ)
{
exp
[
ζi
(
−1
2
(ζi − ζN) θ + x(θ)
)]}
where we have defined the drifted Brownian motion x(t˜) := −ζN t˜/2+W (τ)(t˜) and x(θ) its maximum
value for t˜ ∈ (0, τ˜) with
θ := t˜(t∗) .
Let us observe that
E(τ)
{
exp
[
ζi
(
−1
2
(ζi − ζN) θ + x(θ)
)]}
=
∫ τ˜
0
dθ
∫ +∞
0
dy p
(
θ, y;−ζN
2
)
eζi(−
1
2
(ζi−ζN ) θ+y)
where p(θ, y;−ζN/2) was deduced in the previous technical lemma for a generic drift c. After com-
puting the integral w.r.t. y, and some algebra, we get the result ♣
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